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Abstract 
Les certificats négociables sont un bon outil de promotion 
des activités économiques quand celles-ci permettent 
d’améliorer le surplus social. Les certificats blancs, parce 
qu’ils encouragent les activités destinées à réduire la 
consommation d’énergie et parce que ces activités sont des 
‘biens de confiance’, c’est-à-dire des biens dont la qualité 
réelle ne peut pas être vérifiée, sont contreproductifs. Ils 
suscitent des comportements opportunistes de la part des 
professionnels de la rénovation des bâtiments et de 
l’installation des systèmes de chauffage. Pour rendre le 
système vertueux, il faudrait que les certificats garantissent 
les résultats effectivement mesurés et non des évaluations 
techniques faites ex ante. Compte tenu du coût des 
contrôles, la sincérité des déclarations devrait être assurée 
par de lourdes sanctions en cas d’infractions, ce qui n’est 
pas réalisable quand les entreprises sont trop petites. Il 
faudrait donc encourager une concentration dans le secteur 
de la rénovation des bâtiments en respectant un arbitrage 
entre avantage collectif d’avoir de grosses entreprises 
responsables des performances énergétiques et risques 
d’abus de position dominante ou de collusion sur le marché 
par ces mêmes entreprises. 
 
Tradable certificates are a good tool to promote economic 
activities when they increase the social surplus. White 
certificates are counterproductive, because although they 
encourage activities aimed at reducing energy 
consumption, these activities are ‘credence goods', i.e. 
goods whose real quality cannot be verified. They therefore 
lead to opportunistic behavior by professionals of building 
renovation and heating system installation. In order to make 
the system virtuous, certificates should guarantee the 
results actually measured, instead of ex ante technical 
evaluations. Given the cost of controls, the accuracy of the 
declarations should be ensured by heavy penalties for 
infringements, which is not feasible when companies are 
too small. Concentration in the building renovation sector 
should therefore be encouraged, respecting a trade-off 
between the collective benefit of having large companies 
responsible for energy performance and the risk of abuse of 
a dominant position or collusion by these same companies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Energy utilities are legally bound to 
promote energy efficiency in 24 US States, 14 
European countries, four Australian States and 
Territories, Brazil, Canada, China, Korea, South 
Africa and Uruguay (International Energy 
Agency, 2017, 2020). The majority rely on a 
scheme of ‘white certificates’ (also known as 
‘energy saving certificates’).  
2. These mechanisms are designed to 
correct a perceived ’energy efficiency gap‘. In 
the early 2000s, a few studies (e.g., McKinsey 
2009) argued that energy efficiency 
investments (e.g., attic insulation) were cost 
effective, which means that the value of the 
energy savings appropriately discounted 
exceeds the investment cost necessary to 
reduce energy consumption. In practice, few 
households make these investments. Possible 
explanations for this lack of investment include 
** The authors are solely responsible for the 
opinions expressed in this article, and publication 
does not constitute an endorsement by the 
institutions they belong to. 
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a lack of information (households are not 
aware of the value of the savings), myopia 
(households are aware of the value of the 
savings, but do not value them fully), missing 
supply (households would like to invest but 
cannot find a contractor qualified to do the job) 
or capital constraints (banks do not want to 
lend money on projects with fuzzy returns).  
3. Moreover, in countries where many 
households rent rather than own their 
dwellings, particular attention must be paid to 
misaligned incentives between tenants who 
may not stay long enough to enjoy the full 
value of the energy savings, and owners of 
rented properties who are unsure they can 
pass the value of energy saved through to their 
tenants. To remedy this perceived ’energy 
efficiency gap‘, governments intervene, by 
imposing technical standards, by directly 
subsidizing energy efficiency investments, or 
by encouraging the investments with indirect 
transfers such as white certificates. 
4. Certificates are guarantees that some 
obliged companies – generally the main sellers 
and distributors of energy – have spent 
resources to retrofit industrial facilities, 
commercial sites, or residential dwellings to 
lower the amount of electricity, gas and oil 
consumed. The costs of energy saving 
operations are usually passed through to 
energy final users, and when energy savings 
are guaranteed by white certificates, these are 
intangible assets that can be traded over the 
counter or on a spot market. 
5. Official documents usually present the 
white certificates scheme as ’market-based‘, as 
it specifies only the outcome to be delivered. It 
does not prescribe the type of works to be 
carried out or the type of equipment to be 
installed. The choice is up to decentralized 
decision makers who will find the least-cost 
investment to match the policy makers’ 
objectives.  
6. In reality, the observed results are far 
from the expected ones. The white certificates 
system is very inefficient because it disregards 
information problems, in particular the 
information gap between the professionals 
and the energy final users.  
7. First, it is very difficult to assess at the 
outset the exact value of energy savings since 
they are supposed to last for more than a 
decade. Between the ex-ante planned savings 
and those observed ex-post the difference is 
often large. 
8. Second, there are strong information 
asymmetries among the different agents 
involved, in particular when it comes to 
households. The energy consumers who are 
supposed to benefit from the investment 
partially financed by obliged agents lack the 
expertise and knowledge to accurately 
evaluate the type and quality of the works to 
be carried out and the professionalism of 
subcontractors. Specifically, information 
asymmetry creates three problems. First, as 
households do not have the information 
necessary to select the most cost-effective 
solution for their particular circumstances, 
they rely on the contractors’ suggestions. The 
latter is likely to propose the solution that 
maximizes his profits (e.g., attic insulation), not 
the most cost-effective for the customers (e.g., 
boiler replacement). Thus, renovation works 
completed are unlikely to be the most 
effective. Second, households do not have the 
information necessary to monitor the effort 
exerted by the contactors. Third, as the quality 
of works is not immediately observable (e.g., it 
takes a harsh winter for a household to observe 
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that its attic is poorly insulated), the effects of 
renovation works are unlikely to make a 
difference right away. As a result, the 
difference between the promised savings 
reflected by certificates and those delivered is 
significant.  
9. As it is, the white certificates scheme is 
a flawed ’market-based‘ mechanism, but 
attacks on it on the basis of competition policy 
have been unsuccessful (II). Actually, the 
system’s main flaw is informational. It cannot 
work without either close control by a public 
authority – which means that it is more a 
central-planning tool than a market-based 
scheme –, or scarce controls but high penalties 
in case of performance default – which can 
succeed only if the firms obliged to increase 
energy efficiency are large enough to pay the 
duties without going bankrupt (III). 
II. THE WHITE 
CERTIFICATES MECHANISM  
10. Even though they can differ in the 
details, all systems of white certificates rely on 
the same principles: certificates must be 
produced by obliged agents, who usually 
purchase them from certificate producers that 
perform certain specific tasks (Bertoldi and 
Rezessy, 2008). The result is a complex 
entanglement of the energy production 
markets, the energy efficiency markets and the 
certificates market (A). Partially because of this 
complexity, energy saving programs, in 
particular those sustained by a white 
certificates scheme, are inefficient in terms of 
cost-benefit analysis (B). As governments 
oblige large energy sellers to incur 
expenditures in the equipment market that can 
be passed through to final consumers of 
energy, the system can raise challenges in 
terms of state aid and competition distortions 
(C).  
A. How does it work? 
11. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
governments endeavor to decrease the 
consumption of fossil energy sources. But 
energy is not a final consumption good. It is an 
intermediary good that needs to be combined 
with some form of equipment to produce 
services, e.g., electricity plus a fridge to 
produce cold, or natural gas plus a heater (and 
a well-insulated house) to produce warmth. 
Hence, decreasing the energy burnt without 
deteriorating the services consumed can be 
done by enhancing the performance of the 
accompanying equipment: improving the 
insulation of dwellings, upgrading electrical 
household appliances, using high-performance 
industrial machinery, etc. 
12. In a decentralized framework, this 
should be left to the users’ discretion, with the 
public authority intervening only to oblige 
polluters to internalize the environmental 
damages they cause. As for greenhouse gas 
emissions, the tool favored by economists is a 
carbon tax that would substantially increase 
the cost of burning fossil fuels. They argue that, 
faced with these high fuel costs, energy 
consumers would be incentivized to invest in 
low-consumption equipment, contingently 
helped by social transfers in the case of low-
income households. But the reality is that 
public authorities are reluctant to create new 
taxes or to increase the existing ones, be they 
environmental or not. They favor any form of 
subsidy, as long as the way it is financed 
remains hidden. That is exactly what white 
certificates are designed for. 
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13. The certificates game begins with the 
government obliging energy suppliers (or, in 
some countries energy distributors) to prove 
that they have produced a given amount of 
energy savings (generally proportional to their 
turnover) at consumption locations they freely 
choose. At the end of a fixed period (2 or 3 
years), the obliged agents will have to deliver a 
certain number of certificates stating that the 
works have been completed. But the obliged 
parties are not always qualified to perform the 
works on their own.  
14. Here enters the pivotal agent of this 
game, the insulation specialist or the 
installation technician. Let’s name this person 
‘the artisan’. He or she is the intermediary 
between the obliged companies and the 
energy final users who contract for energy 
savings works or who buy appliances. The 
artisan has two sources of revenue: the bill 
payed by the consumer for the works, and the 
sale to the obliged agent of certificates 
 
1 As an illustration, there are hundreds of data 
sheets giving the equivalence between 






generated by these works. The relationship 
between the works and the number of 
certificates generated is defined roughly at the 
outset. This is very frequent for residential 
heating where efficient boilers, heat pumps, 
insulation and windows are eligible for a 
predetermined present value of saved kWh.1 In 
the case of specific operations, an ad hoc 
measurement of the expected kWh saved is 
necessary to determine how many certificates 
will be delivered.2 
15. An alternative way to obtain the 
required certificates is to buy them from 
obliged agents who have more than their 
obligations, or eligible agents without any 
obligation (e.g. housing associations and 
property management companies). In general, 
trade is over the counter3, but some cases of 
spot markets do exist.4  
16. At the end of the regulation period, the 
obliged party must pay a penalty for each 
missing certificate. In some places, the penalty 
ons_specifiques_installations_fixes-
dispositif_cee_2015_2017ademe_guidetechnique.
pdf for the French guide. 
3 e.g. https://www.emmy.fr/public/donnees-
mensuelles in France 




cancels the obligation to meet the target (e.g. 
France), in others it does not (e.g. Italy).  
17. Overall, the white certificates 
mechanism has many similarities with other 
environmental regulations such as the 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) aimed at 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The main 
difference is that it is national, contrary to the 
ETS that is implemented at the European Union 
scale. They both rely on market mechanisms, 
but they cannot work efficiently without tight 
controls at all stages of the game. This is much 
more difficult to implement for white 
certificates since their sources are widely 
scattered around the country. 
18. Assuming that all the agents involved 
acted as expected, we should observe 
significant decreases in energy consumption 
for two cumulative reasons: first, after the 
investment, consumers can obtain the same 
level of final service with less energy and, 
second, energy is more costly because energy 
suppliers increase their selling prices to 
compensate for the cost of the certificates 
scheme. However, even if the scheme was not 
impaired by the information problems that we 
will discuss in Section III, as shown in the 
Figure, it links up three markets (energy, 
insulation, and certificates) with quite different 
structures. The result is a delicate system, the 
performance of which should be gauged 
comprehensively, not just by measuring the 
virtuous impact on fossil fuel consumption.  
B. Deceptive outcomes 
19. Energy efficiency programs, whatever 
the method used to implement them, seem to 
have decreased energy consumption, even 
though we lack data to distinguish their role 
from the general downturn of economic 
activity (Giraudet and Finon, 2014). But at what 
cost?  
20. To decide upon whether to undertake 
energy savings works, the consumer should 
balance today’s investment cost and the 
discounted value of the future energy savings. 
Only works with a positive net present value 
should be undertaken. Direct subsidies and 
indirect help through certificates or low 
interest rates should be used only to 
compensate for a market failure such as 
missing high carbon prices (that would increase 
the present value of energy savings) or 
borrowing restrictions. 
21. Capital budgeting analysis based on 
expected energy savings shows that 
investments have been profitable (Rezessy and 
Bertoldi, 2010). However, with actual savings 
well below the expected ones, the true average 
performance of the national systems is 
negative. For example, Blaise and Glachant 
(2019) analyze energy efficiency works in the 
French residential sector. They calculate that 
with an investment of €1,000, the value of 
energy savings expected using administrative 
data, which amounts to €65 per year, is much 
larger than the one they measure in their 
sample, which is only €8.39 per year. 
22. Similarly, using a sample of low-income 
households in Michigan, Fowlie et al. (2018) 
find that the upfront investment costs are 
about twice the present value of the actual 
energy savings, mainly because projected 
savings are roughly 2.5 times the actual 
savings. The resulting average rate of return is 
negative, approximately -9.5% annually.  
23. Could such bad performance be due to 
imperfect competition or unfair conditions of 
competition in the emission and trade of 
6 
 
certificates? We consider this possibility in the 
following. 
C. Competition issues 
24. The white certificates mechanism 
generates several potential competition issues. 
First, insofar as funds are channeled from a 
quasi-tax to private construction companies, it 
could be considered state aid (1). Second, since 
handling the obligation has fixed costs and the 
energy savings targets differ from one energy 
to the other, it potentially distorts competition 
between small and large energy suppliers (2). 
Finally, while non-regulated energy retailers 
can freely pass through the additional costs to 
consumers, that is not the case for the utilities 
that sell at regulated tariffs (3). 
1. ARE WHITE CERTIFICATES 
STATE AID?  
25. Energy efficiency is one of the pillars of 
the EU environmental policy, along with the 
abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and 
the promotion of renewable sources of energy. 
Member States must achieve the objectives of 
new savings every year, i) from 1 January 2014 
to 31 December 2020, of 1.5 % of annual 
energy sales to final customers; and ii) from 1 
January 2021 to 31 December 2030, of 0.8 % of 
annual final energy consumption.5  
26. According to the ‘Guidelines on State 
aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020’ (2014/C 200/01), energy-savings 
measures are part of ‘environmental 
protection’. To reach the target, governments 
can freely choose the aid instrument, provided 
that it is coherent with the market failure that 
it aims at addressing, and that it does not 
 
5 Directive (2012/27/EU) amended in 2018 
(2018/2002) 
infringe upon the regulation on state aid. 
White certificates are not mentioned in these 
texts. Could they be state aid that is not in 
accordance with EU rules? 
27. In February 2014, an association of 
French retail energy operators asked the 
Conseil d’Etat (the supreme administrative 
jurisdiction in France) to cancel a 2013 decree 
that extended by one year the second three-
year period of energy saving obligations.  
28. In order to soften the system 
constraints, the association of retailers had 
chosen a line of attack in terms of State aid by 
referring to a decision of the European 
Commission concerning the emission trading 
scheme for nitrogen oxides in the Netherlands 
(State Aid n° N35/2003).6 The Commission had 
decided that the NOx emission trading scheme 
constituted State aid within the meaning of 
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty (now 107 of 
TFEU). The Commission also concluded that 
such aid is compatible with the Common 
Market.  
29. By relating the French white 
certificates to the Dutch trading scheme, the 
plaintiffs wanted to focus on one possible 
infringement of the regulation by the French 
authorities. When creating the energy savings 
certificates in 2005, the French government did 
not notify the Commission. Yet, except for 
block exemption, de minimis aid, and aid in a 
category already authorized by the 
Commission, EU State aid control requires prior 
notification to the Commission, and Member 
States must wait for the Commission's decision 
before they can put the measure into effect 
(Art. 108 TFEU).  
6 For a follow-up on this case, see Slot 2013. 
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30. The Conseil d’Etat dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ application on the basis that in State 
Aid n° N35/2003 referred to above, the 
Commission distinguishes two kinds of trade 
systems: a) systems where a tradable emission 
or pollution document is considered an 
intangible asset representing a market value 
which the authorities could have sold or 
auctioned, leading to foregone revenues (or a 
loss of State resources), hence State aid, and b) 
systems where a tradable emission or pollution 
document is considered as authorized proof of 
a certain production that cannot be sold or 
auctioned to the recipient, hence there are no 
foregone revenues, therefore no State 
resources, and no State aid.  
31. In the French system, the certificates 
are just authorized proof that cannot be sold by 
the government. In other words, they are not 
granted from State sources, neither directly 
nor indirectly, which means that the scheme is 
not State aid.7 This can be viewed as a quality 
of the certificates system if the national 
authorities want to skip the obligation to wait 
for the green light from the European 
Commission. In any event, the poor economic 
performance of energy efficiency campaigns 
sustained by white certificates seems to be 
unrelated to a distortion of competition 
imputable to public transfers. 
2. MARKET DISTORTIONS 
32. The graph shows that the three 
markets for certificates, energy sales, and 
energy savings have quite different structures. 
Let us examine how the certificates scheme 
 
7 On the economic analysis of State aid, see Besley 
and Seabright (1999), Spector (2009), and 
Dewatripont and Seabright (2010). 
could impair competition mechanisms on each 
of them.  
33. On the certificates market. One 
recurrent complaint by opponents of the 
certificates scheme is that it gives a 
competitive advantage to the incumbents at 
the expense of new entrants, because energy 
efficiency obligations are computed with 
respect to the quantity sold without 
considering market shares. They argue that it 
gives the incumbents a specific trading capacity 
as they can obtain or buy large volumes of 
certificates. It is true that when the certificates 
are exchanged over the counter, large holders 
could try to abuse their dominant position in 
bilateral bargaining with artisans or eligible 
parties by buying at low prices, and with 
obliged parties by selling them at high prices 
when their net demand for certificates is high. 
However, we are not aware of any case of 
abuse in the certificates markets. The most 
likely reason is that there are numerous 
sources of white certificates, so that all obliged 
firms can easily find the quantities they need at 
a cost well below the default penalty. This 
could change in the future with higher volumes 
to collect and more costly works to extract the 
certificates.  
34. On the energy markets. The very 
creation of obligations generates distortions in 
the exercise of competition, and when the 
obligations rely on tradable certificates, the 
distortions are even more difficult to identify 
and measure. For example, the obliged firms 
incur a fixed cost of implementation. As this 
organization cost is independent of the 
quantity of certificates to handle, the larger the 
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obliged firm, the smaller the impact on its unit 
total cost of production. How much of the 
certificates’ cost each energy seller can pass 
through to end users depends on its current 
profits and the price elasticity of energy 
demand. To avoid the double cost of: i) paying 
for energy savings and ii) having lower sales, 
energy sellers can try to promote energy 
savings at locations using an energy different 
from their own. For example, a seller of natural 
gas can promote the replacement of electric 
heaters by gas-fired heaters. This is not 
forbidden by law and can easily be countered 
with a symmetric offensive by the competitor 
selling electricity.  
35. Another potential distortion relates to 
the exemption thresholds of obliged parties. 
Recall that only ’large‘ firms have the obligation 
to collect certificates. As the energy industry is 
heterogeneous, the exemption conditions will 
most likely differ from one sector to the other, 
for example between electricity and motor 
fuels. If the thresholds that separate obliged 
and non-obliged parties differ for two energies 
that are near substitutes, there is an obvious 
distortion of competition. By contrast, if each 
type of energy has its own relevant market, a 
differential treatment is innocuous.8 
36. On the energy efficiency markets. 
Large established firms can organize networks 
of artisans that will use the incumbents’ 
reputation to convince final users that they 
need energy savings works. Then, even if the 
obliged parties do not directly enter the market 
of energy efficiency, they have a leverage that 
can distort competition there. A more direct 




appliances jointly with energy contracts – a 
bundling strategy that can be very efficient in 
terms of energy savings but distortive in terms 
of competition. 
37. The relationship between the artisan 
and the energy consumer is more problematic. 
Whereas there is a large number of artisans at 
national scale, they are not very numerous in a 
given region. After the energy consumer has 
requested works quotations from several 
providers, it cannot easily compare the offers 
to choose the best one. On these markets, 
transactions look more like imbalanced 
bilateral arrangements than fairly competitive 
agreements. We address the problem in 
Section III.  
38. Relevant market. How should 
certificates be considered in merger cases? 
When two firms with energy savings 
obligations want to merge, should the 
competition authorities consider the market 
for certificates separately from the market(s) 
of the product they sell, or rather like a mere 
mandatory regulatory scheme. If it is a 
separate market, the merger impact must be 
measured by variations in the concentration 
indices on complementary markets (energy + 
certificates).  
39. The relevant geographical market is 
clearly national when the certificates targets 
and the way to collect them are defined by 
national authorities. Extending energy savings 
obligations up to a supra-national scale would 
be quite complex. It would necessitate the 
certification of measures undertaken by 
obliged firms outside their country and/or the 
control of the veracity and quality of the 
R:2018:410360.20181203 for a case examined in 
France by the Conseil d’Etat. 
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certificates bought in other countries 
(European Commission, 2009: 38-41) 
40. By contrast, according to the European 
Commission, the definition of the relevant 
product market remains an open question for 
white certificates. 9  From a purely economic 
point of view, we could consider that there is a 
relevant market for certificates, whatever their 
color. The core issue is to mitigate global 
warming, and together energy efficiency, GHG 
emissions abatement and the promotion of 
renewables all work toward this objective. 
White, green, and brown (EU-ETS) certificates 
could thus be viewed as substitutes in a large 
market for environmental obligations. This is a 
view to consider as the fight against global 
warming becomes a priority in public policies 
(Sorrell et al. 2009).  
3. ENERGY PRICES VS. TARIFFS 
41. In some countries, the opening of 
energy retail to competition is not complete. 
The incumbents still have the obligation to 
propose contracts with tariffs that are fixed by 
a public authority, for example the energy 
regulation agency.     
42. When both the energy sellers subject 
to some form of price regulations (e.g. 
electricity and gas prices in the residential 
sector) and those without price regulation (e.g. 
heating oil suppliers or transport fuel suppliers) 
are under certificates obligations, the latter 
may have a competitive advantage in terms of 
passing through all costs from energy savings 
compliance in end-use prices, while regulated 
entities are not free to do so (European 





43. In regulation contracts, the share of 
costs the regulated firms cannot avoid is 
covered by the tariff under a cost-plus rule. 
Since the utilities cannot avoid the white 
savings obligation, they should see their tariffs 
cover this additional cost. However, looking 
closer at the problem, the certificates cost is 
equal to  the required quantities multiplied by 
their unit cost or price. It is true that the 
obliged firms cannot modify the quantity of 
white certificates they must submit. They still 
have some leeway on the certificates cost or 
the price they pay to certificates sellers. If the 
regulated firm has the guarantee of full cost 
recovery through the energy tariffs, it has little 
incentive to adopt least-cost energy savings, 
but it faces the risk of losing clients attracted 
by the competitors’ contracts. Then, when 
collecting certificates, the regulated firms will 
not behave very differently from their free-
market competitors. 
44. Overall, the above sketchy analysis 
suggests that all the energy sellers involved in 
the white certificates game are reasonably 
fairly treated. Neither the energy markets nor 
the certificates markets seem to be impaired 
by the white certificates scheme as regards 
competition policy. This is not true when we 
consider the markets for works, where the 
energy consumers and the artisans interact.  
III. THE VULNERABILITY 
OF ENERGY CONSUMERS 
45. White certificates increase demand for 
renovation works. In all sectors, when demand 
increases, existing firms expand their 
workforce, or new firms enter the market. In 
df, pages 29-30. This view was taken up by the 
French competition authority in Decision n°19-
DCC-195, October 22nd, 2019. 
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most economic settings, increasing 
competition, in particular increasing entry by 
new firms, increases consumers’ surplus. This 
may be different in the energy efficiency 
sector: somewhat paradoxically, by increasing 
entry in the home renovation industry, the 
white certificates scheme may reduce welfare. 
This is due to the informational gap between 
the agents who need energy efficiency works 
and the artisans who execute them (A). A 
scheme based on performance contracts 
would be welfare-enhancing by curbing both 
problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard (B).  
A. Information issues 
46. End users of energy face two 
informational challenges when negotiating 
with artisans. First, they are not able to 
distinguish between those who are well 
prepared and equipped, and those who are 
not. This is a problem of adverse selection in 
the lingo of contract theory (Christensen et al., 
2020). Second, there is a problem of moral 
hazard: all agents, skilled or not, incur costs 
when exerting high levels of effort (Giraudet et 
al. 2018a). If the effort cannot be observed and 
verified by the ordering customer, the agent’s 
effort will be suboptimal.  
47. The adverse selection problem (is the 
artisan intrinsically good or bad?) can be 
partially solved by means of an accreditation 
system. The good artisans have a common 
interest in delivering a label of skillfulness, but 
they still have to inform and convince the 
energy consumers that it is not a fake label 
(Dranove and Jin, 2010). Firms with a good 
reputation – which supposes they are not new 
entrants –, can use their brand as a label. 
Otherwise, the label must be delivered by a 
public authority. 
48. The moral hazard question (does the 
artisan work as hard as he should?) is trickier. 
If the results of the effort could be verified with 
certainty in the short run, the artisan could be 
made responsible for any bad result. Even in 
this simple case, by how much he should be 
fined is not a straightforward question (see B 
below). As energy savings are expected to last 
for more than a decade, not all the expected 
results can be measured precisely. Giraudet et 
al. (2018a) provide empirical evidence of moral 
hazard in the U.S. home retrofit market. They 
find that actual energy savings are subject to 
day-of-the-week effects: energy savings are 
significantly lower when works are done on a 
Friday rather than another weekday, probably 
because of lower workers’ productivity. They 
show that the Friday effect explains 65% of the 
discrepancy between predicted and actual 
energy savings.  
49. Lastly, note that the final performance 
of the energy savings works also depends on 
external events that are out of the artisan’s 
control (e.g. storms, snow) and on the behavior 
of the consumer (Wirl, 2015). Encouraged by 
new equipment, consumers will have an 
incentive to increase their consumption of 
energy services, for example to buy additional 
appliances, with the result of burning more 
energy. This ’rebound effect‘ is not the 
responsibility of the artisan. 
50. Energy efficiency works belong to the 
category of ’credence goods‘ (Giraudet, 2020), 
which means that their true quality will never 
be fully revealed to the buyer. Other categories 
are medical treatment, taxi travel, and car 
repairs. For this type of good, inappropriate 
treatment and overcharging are quite 
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common. The economic literature reports on 
lab and field experiments analyzing the scope 
of the problem and offering some feasible 
solutions (Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2017).  
51. The discrepancy between expected 
and actual energy savings is not entirely due to 
white certificates since the informational gap 
on insulation works is the main cause. 
However, by encouraging undertakings with 
almost uncontrollable quality, the certificates 
system worsens the welfare damage. 
B. Second best for energy 
efficiency and white 
certificates 
52. From the preceding discussion, it 
clearly appears that no energy efficiency 
program will reach a first-best level, 
irrespective of how it is sustained: 
technological standards, direct subsidies, 
reduced interest rates or certificates (1). One 
second best solution is to foster a 
concentration in the renovation works industry 
and to make the resulting large firms 
responsible for the measured ex post 
outcomes of the undertakings they have 
sustained through the certificates emitted (2).  
1. ENERGY EFFICIENCY AS A 
CREDENCE GOOD 
53. Due to the severity of information 
asymmetry problems, new firms (or existing 
firms expanding) need not deliver appropriate 
(effective) and high-quality (efficient) 
renovation solutions. In fact, since the subsidy 
reduces incentives for customers to evaluate 
and monitor the works, it is likely that low-cost 
low-quality firms enter more massively, or that 
existing firms expand in the low-cost low-
quality segment. This means that white 
certificates are likely to reduce the average Net 
Present Value (NPV) of the renovation projects 
completed. 
54. Empirical studies find that the NPV of 
renovation projects is negative on average 
(Fowlie et al. 2015, 2018). Therefore, white 
certificates that increase the volume of 
renovation work increase the aggregate 
negative NPV from renovation projects. Since 
that aggregate negative NPV is financed by an 
excise tax on energy users, their net surplus is 
decreased. Of course, this decrease in net 
surplus is partially compensated by the 
increased profit from the construction firms. 
But the policy, by increasing low-cost low-
quality competition, leaves customers worse 
off. 
55. The first-best solution to the perceived 
’energy efficiency gap‘ would be to set an 
adequate price for CO2, so that the pollution 
externality is correctly accounted for in 
households’ energy bills. It would then be to 
educate households on the value of different 
energy efficiency investments. This would 
increase households’ propensity to undertake 
energy efficiency investment.  
56. The second-best way to promote 
efficient energy savings is to consider the 
activity as a credence good and to design a 
solution that balances the unavoidable 
information asymmetries and the will to 
increase the investment in energy efficiency. 
Since credence goods are such that buyers are 
unable to know whether the quality they 
observe is in line with the inputs they have paid 
for, the control of quality must be transferred 
to a third-party with a sanctioning power, and 
the sellers must be made liable for the results 
(Dulleck et al. 2011).  
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2. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS 
57. On practical grounds, to alleviate the 
information asymmetry problem in the field of 
energy efficiency, policy makers should 
encourage the use of performance contracts. 
The contractor is remunerated through the 
measurable energy savings realized, not by an 
upfront payment based on savings estimates. 
This aligns the incentives of the contractor, the 
household, and society at large. 
58. Performance contracts would solve the 
selection-adverse problem since it would be in 
the interests of the firms to provide training to 
their employees. They would transfer the 
moral hazard problem to the internal 
relationship between the contracting firm and 
its employees or subcontractors. Finally, they 
would be welfare improving as regards 
exogeneous information asymmetries (climate 
events, appliance outages) since it would entail 
a transfer of risks from highly risk-averse 
customers (in particular households) to weakly 
risk-averse large operators.  
59. Performance contracts present two 
challenges. First, since they create significant 
risk for the contractor, only large firms have the 
financial capacity to offer them. This then leads 
to a consolidated energy efficiency industry: 
possibly a large number of local subcontractors 
who undertake renovations under the control 
of 5 to 10 large, national, energy efficiency 
firms. This degree of concentration would 
warrant strong antitrust attention to prevent 
abuse of dominance and collusion. 
60. Second, energy performance contracts 
are by nature complex contracts. For example, 
savings on energy consumption is good for 
society, and it is easy to measure with smart 
electricity and gas meters. But what about the 
financial gains for the consumer? How are 
savings computed when the underlying energy 
price increases or decreases? In the first case, 
the investment has been undersized; in the 
second case, the gains are smaller than 
expected.  
61. Who is responsible for these 
“miscalculations”? Large energy customers 
have highly specialized staff in their purchasing 
departments, dedicated to negotiating and 
managing such contracts. Without help, small 
customers will find it difficult to do so. One 
possible solution would be for an agency to 
draft standard contracts, or standard contract 
clauses, to limit the risk of households signing 
inappropriate contracts. Also, the same agency 
could support households in contract 
management. This means that the public 
backing of the white certificates scheme must 
go beyond the mere writing of technical data 
sheets, with the creation of a clear 
responsibilities framework.  
62. To guarantee the efficiency of the 
consolidated energy efficiency industry, public 
controls need to be frequent and/or highly 
penalizing when inadequate performance is 
observed. Today, controls are scarce and are 
only carried out in the case of complaints 
(DGCCRF, 2019: 40). Since controls are costly, 
rather than increasing their number, the level 
of the penalties should be increased. In France, 
the 2019 Law on Energy and Climate has 
modified the level of pecuniary penalties in 
case of observed mismatch between the works 
and the emitted certificates. It has been 
increased from 2% to 4% of turnover excluding 
tax, and from 4% to 6% in the event of a new 
breach of the same obligation.  
63. Note that the “concentration remedy” 
mainly concerns renovation works. The 
appliances industry is already quite 
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concentrated, and manufacturers have been 
implementing systems of quality certification 
with guaranties, voluntarily or under 
mandatory rules, for a long time already 
(Nauleau et al. 2015). 
64. In this consolidation process, energy 
retailers could play a more active role through 
a vertical integration with firms in the 
renovation industry (Giraudet et Finon, 2011). 
Note that this is not necessary a de facto 
financial integration. It can be soft, by means of 
long-term provision contracts.  
65. In this paper, we have disregarded the 
important problem of fuel poverty. All 
programs that increase the cost of energy have 
distributional consequences. Since low-income 
households dedicate a larger share of their 
income to energy than do wealthier people, all 
certificates systems are regressive. Therefore, 
energy efficiency programs, whatever their 
financial backing, must be accompanied by 
subsidies to low-income customers (Giraudet 
et al., 2018b). 
66. Finally, given the informational biases 
identified above, the need for reliably 
controlling the works and identifying 
deviations, and the necessary support to low-
income energy consumers, the question 
remains of why governments delegate energy 
efficiency programs to energy sellers rather 
than implementing them directly (Giraudet et 
al, 2019).  
IV. CONCLUSION  
67. All the countries that have created 
white certificates to support their energy 
efficiency programs seem to be satisfied with 
the outcomes. They even try to enlarge the 
scope of the programs. However, the ’good‘ 
results they are proud of are computed on the 
basis of energy savings determined 
administratively ex ante. Evidence shows that 
the real savings, when observed ex post, are 
well below the expected levels (ADEME 2020, 
Glachant et al. 2020). 
68. The reason for this bad performance is 
due more to the very nature of energy savings 
than to white certificates. Works dedicated to 
domestic or industrial energy savings belong to 
the category of ’credence goods’, which means 
that they cannot be fully verified, neither ex 
ante nor ex post. As guarantees of the energy 
savings works, white certificates transmit 
erroneous information. Additionally, as they 
encourage the production of these credence 
goods, they are detrimental for welfare. 
69. Certificates guaranteeing the 
achievement of performance contracts, that is, 
based on ex post results, would be welfare 
enhancing. A public entity would need to check 
the results against the certificates. Given the 
high cost of ex post controls, the scheme would 
necessitate severe fines in case of 
infringement, with a risk of bankruptcy if a firm 
that is proved guilty is small.  
70. To be efficient, the system of 
performance contracts certified by white 
certificates requires the consolidation of the 
renovation and insulation industry. This implies 
firms large enough to have qualified 
employees, capable of controlling the effective 
operation of the work, and financially sound 
enough to be liable in case of noncompliance.  
71. An alternative form of this 
consolidation process is greater involvement of 
the obliged energy retailers in the energy 
process, either by the bundling of appliances 
and energy sales, or by a vertical integration of 
activities, at least under a soft form. This would 
imply the signing of long-term contracts with 
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artisans, that would be more tightly controlled 
than at present.  
72. The drawback of this reform is a 
weakening of competition in terms of the 
number of operators. It means that the 
competition authority should be more careful 
in controlling contract design and pricing 
practices. 
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